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Countries and regions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have gone through 
several challenges. They went through totalitarian and authoritarian communist 
regimes, gained independence at the end of the 19th century, faced new 
economic and political challenges and rejoined Europe in a perspective of 
mutual development.
As different as they may be, despite recent populist movements, the CEE 
countries have much in common and regional policies can help the “forgotten 
places” to explore their opportunities, supporting democracy, cohesion, and 
local economies in the European Union.
Grzegorz Gorzelak is a professor of economics, specialising in regional and local 
development policies and strategy building. He has collaborated with the World 
Bank, the OECD, DG Regio of the European Commission, several agencies of the 
Polish and Ukrainian governments, as well as regional and local authorities.
This is the fourteenth essay in the Big Ideas series created by the European 
Investment Bank.
The EIB has invited international thought leaders and experts to write about 
the most important issues of the day. These essays are a reminder that we 
need new thinking to protect the environment, promote equality and improve 







The trajectories of the countries and regions of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) during the last hundred years do prove that almost everything is 
possible. In this relatively short period these countries have regained 
independence, have suffered during World War Two, have gone through 
totalitarian and authoritarian communist regimes and lastly they have 
rejoined Europe, moving from the second to the “first periphery” of the 
developed world. Although at the start of their EU membership the “end of 
history” may have appeared as a plausible way to look to the future of CEE, 
recently unexpected phenomena have questioned these hopes and placed 
several new challenges before the 
new Member States.
Two of these challenges seem the 
most important: the political and 
the economic. After the initial period 
of institutional convergence, a few 
years ago a stream of right-wing 
populism movements emerged 
and spread in most of the CEE 
countries, and the European values 
of deliberative democracy and the 
rule of law have come to be replaced 
by growing centralisation, breaking 
constitutional orders and even 
introducing some manifestations of authoritarian rule. The migration crisis 
of 2015-2016 aggravated these processes, since all CEE countries disagreed 
with the EU’s stance on this issue. Thus, at this moment, the rationale of 
Eastern enlargement, although not yet questioned openly, has become a 




  After the initial 
period of institutional 
convergence, a few years 
ago a stream of right-wing 
populism movements 
emerged and spread in 
most of the CEE countries, 
and the European values 
of deliberative democracy 
and the rule of law have 
come to be replaced by 
growing centralisation.
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The most recent coronavirus pandemic has posed additional economic 
challenges. It has to be remembered that the economic success of CEE was, 
to a great extent, the result of the incorporation of these countries into 
global value chains and the relocation of many industries from the West to 
the East of Europe. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was the main channel for 
innovation and technology transfers to the CEE countries. Global recession 
caused by the pandemic has seriously jeopardised the supply networks 
on which the economies of the CEE countries strongly depend. The broad 
tourist sector has become another field in which the CEE economies have 
suffered because of the pandemic.
These two challenges have a clear regional manifestation. The political 
changes clearly negatively affect local and regional governments, which 
in some CEE countries have already acquired a strong position in the 
institutional order of public management. The economic crisis may affect 
the metropolitan cores of the CEE countries, which since the post-socialist 
transition have become the main engines of transformation, attracting FDI 
into the modern value and knowledge-intensive services. The switch to 
teleworking and telecommuting may negatively influence metropolitan 
employment in CEE and leave many new offices idle, as well as hotels, 
apartments and tourist services in the largest cities of CEE. By the same 
token, weakening of industrial networks may jeopardise the development 
of several industrial regions in CEE which have gone through successful 
industrial restructuring, to a large extent due to the involvement of 
Western European capital (now under protectionist pressure of several EU 
governments).
Should one be pessimistic? Probably not, since the CEE countries have 
proved – over the last century – that they are able to overcome even the 
most severe difficulties, and nowadays they may enjoy encouragement, 
shelter and assistance from the European Union, so widely appreciated 
by the societies of CEE, even if some political elites of these countries may 
sound Eurosceptic (but not when financial transfers are involved).
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  The post-socialist 
transformation of CEE 
can be considered to 
be one of the greatest 
developments in 
modern history.
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The post-socialist transformation of CEE can be considered to be one of 
the greatest developments in modern history. Unexpectedly, a group 
of countries emerged from an autocratic political system and centrally 
planned economy and within the 
space of a single generation was able 
to build pluralistic democracies and 
open market economies. Economic 
development proceeded quickly[1].
Of course, this process was not 
smooth. Several obstacles, upheavals 
and tensions occurred during all 
stages of the transition, and particularly during the global financial crisis 
that began in 2008-2009. However, already at the beginning of the 2000s 
most of the CEE countries were able to meet the fundamental standards 
set by the European Union and started achieving clear convergence with 
the Western European countries in both economic and institutional terms.
The issue of convergence[2] is especially important since the CEE countries 
have for centuries been less developed than their western counterparts. 
This was due to long historical processes (what F. Braudel called the longue 
durée[3]) whose foundations were laid by the Roman Empire (many of the 
present CEE countries were located beyond its boundaries, i.e. beyond the 
limes). This situation was further reinforced by the division of Europe into 
its more developed western part which, from the 16th century onwards, 
moved from agriculture to industry and from feudalism to capitalism, 
and its eastern part, which remained feudal for a long time (until the 19th 
century), and whose economy was based on agriculture. More recently, 
the East-West division of Europe by the Iron Curtain after the Second 
World War aggravated the backwardness of Central and Eastern Europe[4]. 
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The last 30 years have not closed this structural gap, but have reduced it 
to a large extent. To use Wallerstein’s[5] terminology, Central and Eastern 
Europe has begun its journey from the second to the first periphery of 
Europe, bringing most of its regions closer to the centres of capital, 
technology and democracy.
Figure 1.  Dynamic of GDP growth, 1989=100, constant prices
*Estimate.
Various sources, prepared jointly with M. Smętkowski.
The Central and Eastern European countries are internally differentiated, 
and the national processes assumed varied forms and shapes in their 
particular territorial entities. Also, a number of the challenges the CEE 
countries faced have a clear regional dimension. 
The CEE countries have benefited from the EU Cohesion Policy and 
Common Agricultural Policy, two major priorities of the European Union. 
The current political climates in certain CEE countries may pose some of 
the most difficult challenges for the future of European integration and 
continued cohesion with the West.
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THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
REGIONS AFTER SOCIALISM
The CEE countries entered the challenging phase of transformation (the 
majority in 1990, although the Baltic Republics reached this point slightly 
later with the collapse of the Soviet Union) with strongly polarised regional 
structures and deep spatial inequalities, a number of over-industrialised 
cities, underdeveloped infrastructure, a polluted environment and 
limited private ownership of agricultural land. All of them had to struggle 
with a deep recession that consumed as much as 20% of their GDP 
(see Figure 1). The collapse of several industrial plants – mostly caused by 
their lack of competitiveness in a new, open economy – radical changes in 
the agricultural ownership structure, and unprecedented unemployment 
with growing niches of poverty, shaped the socioeconomic reality of 
these countries at the beginning of the post-socialist transition.
During the first phase of the post-socialist transformation, the regional 
patterns showed a strong differentiation. Few types of regional reactions 
to transformation can be identified.
 
  The CEE countries entered the challenging 
phase of transformation with strongly polarised 
regional structures and deep spatial inequalities, 
some over-industrialised cities, underdeveloped 
infrastructure, polluted environment, limited 
private ownership of agricultural land. 
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Table 1. Regional reactions to the post-socialist transformation











Capital and large cities
Diversified economy, skilled labour, 










Tourist & re-industrialised regions





Poorly accessible, obsolete 
structures, low qualifications, 
outmigration
Source:  Gorzelak G., “Regional development in Central and Eastern Europe”, in: Blokker P., Dalago B. (eds.): 
Regional Diversity and Local Development in New Member States, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
The leaders – the metropolitan regions. In the socialist economy heavily 
industrialised, large cities were the strongest nodes of the territorial systems 
of Central and Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union, those 
regions went through the process of restructuring, the main phenomenon 
of which was deindustrialisation. However, due to their diversified 
socioeconomic structures and good connectivity, they were able to offer 
the best location conditions for the most dynamic sectors – internationally 
connected knowledge-intensive services (financial, managerial, tourist, 
scientific, etc.), high-quality commerce – the so-called metropolitan 
functions[6]. Moreover, their suburban rings have been growing even faster 
due to the rapid and, in most cases, uncontrolled suburbanisation of the 
residential areas of the middle and upper classes. All capital cities of the 
CEE countries and large (over half a million inhabitants) cities in Poland are 
examples of regional leaders.
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CHORZOW, IN UPPER SILESIA.  
THE HISTORICAL REGION OF UPPER 
SILESIA IS LOCATED MOSTLY IN 
POLAND, WITH SMALL PARTS IN  
THE CZECH REPUBLIC.
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 The losers were the old industrial regions, which had played an important 
role in the socialist economy, attracting migrants from the countryside 
and offering relatively highly paid jobs. However, their economies were 
not diversified, living conditions were relatively poor due to delayed 
urbanisation (or under-urbanisation, as I. Szelenyi labelled it[7]), the 
qualifications of the labour force were relatively low and narrowly 
specialised, and the natural environment deteriorated over time. As a result, 
their restructuring was long and painful, and some of these industrial cities 
and regions have only recently been able to re-enter the growth path and 
develop modern industrial sectors and certain metropolitan functions. 
The coal and steel region of Upper Silesia, the cities with shipyards along 
the Baltic Sea, the textile industry regions like Łódź and its surroundings 
in Poland, and the region of Maribor in Slovenia are some examples of 
industrial regions that had to go through difficult restructuring, in several 
cases with high social costs.
The winners – tourist and re-industralised regions. These were several 
regions that had possessed potentials which were overlooked in the 
socialist, industrial pattern of development, but which were given an 
opportunity to respond to emerging demand in the open, competitive 
economy, e.g. the tourist regions. A number of other regions in which 
re-industrialisation occurred (often due to foreign investment that brought 
new technologies, new products and opened new markets) have also 
been doing rather well. Special Economic Zones, located in previously 
problematic areas, spurred economic revival. The Rzeszów region in 
south-east Poland is an excellent example of a region whose industry was 
reborn after receiving foreign investment, mostly in the high-tech sector; 
the Budapest-Gyor road corridor, extending to Vienna, became a business 
cluster after the borders were opened; north-west Romanian regions also 
accelerated their growth due to their location (shorter distance to the core 
of Europe) and tourist potential. 
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In most countries, the laggards were the eastern regions. This structural 
underdevelopment has to be attributed to the processes of Braudelian 
longue durée, since the late medieval modernisation divided the CEE 
countries along the line Gdańsk – Vistula river – Pest – Pécs – Ragusa 
(nowadays Dubrovnik) line: technological (mostly agricultural) and 
institutional innovations (from towns under Magdeburg and Lübeck laws, 
cloisters and universities) spreading from Western Europe to the East lost 
their momentum at that point, thus causing most of the eastern regions to 
lag behind their western counterparts. Also, several border regions, located 
on the eastern edge of EU-15, such as the Sudeten region of Czechia, near 
the German border, or the northern regions of Bulgaria along the border 
with Romania, as well as the southern Bulgarian regions bordering Greece, 
have stagnated. In the Baltic States the regions bordering Belarus and Russia 
have also suffered most (the capital city region of Vilnius is an exception). 
These areas are less developed and lack major urban centres, as well as 
major modern transport infrastructure. The majority of these regions are 
losing population due to outmigration to larger cities and abroad. Most of 





THOUSAND OF POLES GATHERED 
TO HEAR LECH WALESA’S SPEECH 
IN THE RUN-UP TO THE POLISH 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1990.
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EARLY 1990s:  
FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
The institutional reforms, aiming at building the democratic system, also 
embraced territorial public management and politics. The restoration 
of local and regional government[8] was an important part of building 
democratic institutions. This was an intellectual and political revolution, as 
well as a change in the mechanisms of economic development. 
The very first fully democratic election in CEE took place in Poland 
on 27 May 1990 – and this was the local election. A few months later, 
democratic elections for the restored 
local governments were also held in 
Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, soon 
to be followed by other CEE countries. 
Several reforms followed in these 
countries, and supra-local tiers were 
established in several countries. At 
present, the territorial structures of the 
CEE countries are composed of three 
tiers of territorial public administration 
(Poland), two tiers (Croatia, Czechia, 
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) or just 
one tier in the case of the smaller Baltic 
States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
However, in all countries at the beginning of democratisation the regional 
authorities were weak, and the full reform of regional (supra-local) 
governments was not undertaken at that time. The regions were not strong 
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After the collapse of the centralised system, a comprehensive regional 
policy was not formulated in any of the CEE countries and the regional 
aspects of social or economic policies were almost non-existent[9]. In fact, 
the governments of all these countries left “regional problems” to so-called 
market forces, allowing the new economic patterns in their countries to 
be reshaped by sectoral processes. Employment/unemployment policies 
became the main field of government interventions, which have had 
some spatial/regional dimensions in 
terms of the application of certain 
economic instruments (investment 
incentives, extended unemployment 
benefits, etc.) in regions affected by 
exceptionally high unemployment[10]. 
Regional policies slowly developed, 
and accession to the European Union 
forced the preparation of national 
development strategies and their 
spatial/regional components. Also, 
the regions of the CEE countries 
were obliged to draw up their own 
strategic documents. 
In general, the regional typology described above (leaders, losers, 
winners, laggards) has persisted for the entire post-1990 period. 
The regional values of GDP per capita (PPP) reflect these processes 
(Figures 2 and 3). 
  Slovenia and  
Czechia are currently 
the most developed 
countries and at 
the same time the 
least regionally 
differentiated. Bulgaria 
and Romania are the 
least developed ones, 




BULGARIA’S PRODUCTION OF  
ROSE OIL AMOUNTS TO 45%  
OF THE WORLD’S PRODUCTION.
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Figure 2.  GDP/inhabitant, PPP, 
2015, EUR
Figure 3.  GDP/inhabitant, PPP, 
2015, country=100
Source:  Gorzelak G., Smętkowski M., “Regional dynamics and structural changes in Central and Eastern 
European countries”, in: Gorzelak G. (ed.), Social and Economic…, op.cit., pp. 207-224.
Slovenia and Czechia are currently the most developed countries and at 
the same time the least regionally differentiated[11]. Bulgaria and Romania 
are the least developed countries, and their internal differentiation is 
greater (Figures 4 and 5).
All NUTS3 regions in Eastern Europe[12] with big cities present higher 
GDP values per inhabitant. According to the ranking based on business 
connections[13], Warsaw is included among the Alpha cities, Prague and 
Budapest are in the group Alpha minus, Bucharest in Beta plus, Sofia and 
Zagreb in Beta, Bratislava in Beta minus, Riga in Gamma +, Ljubljana, Tallinn 
and Vilnius in Gamma. These cities are visible on the maps of global 
business, which allows them to develop their modern economies based 
on knowledge-intensive services. Conversely, several eastern, peripheral 
regions – such as the south-eastern region of Latvia, and eastern 
regions of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary and Romania – 
still have the lowest GDP values per person. 
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This is largely because the industry there is mostly agricultural. But it is 
also caused by poor accessibility, the relatively low level of skills and 
qualifications, and outmigration. These areas are of little interest to foreign 
investors. All these factors have led to their economic stagnation. 
Generally speaking, since the 1990s regional divergence has clearly 
been the predominant trend in the CEE macroregion, caused both by 
metropolisation and by stagnation in the weakest, peripheral regions – the 
factors most responsible for this process. However, in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 2008-2010, some signs of reversal of this pattern could be 
observed (Figure 4). In most of the CEE countries – excluding Romania and 
Bulgaria – the regional differentiation of GDP per inhabitant unexpectedly 
came to a halt, and in some CEE countries even reversed. 
There are a few hypotheses explaining this fact. In between the extremes 
of “leaders” and “laggards”, which remain in the highest and the lowest 
positions on the GDP per person rankings, considerable changes 
took place among the group of regions whose rates of development 
depended on the progress of restructuring processes and diversification 
of local economic structures. Firstly, several industrial regions (but rarely 
those dominated by traditional industries) have undergone successful 
restructuring, thus moving up in the regional GDP per person rankings 
(e.g. the above-mentioned Rzeszów region, but also the Debrecen and 
Miskolc regions, and a number of Slovak regions). Secondly, most of the 
“winners” that used to be relatively less developed, developed fast, and 
advanced in these rankings. Thirdly, the initially spatially limited diffusion 
of growth from the metropolitan cores has begun to reach greater 
distances. Additionally, outmigration from the less developed, peripheral 
eastern regions has led to the simple statistical effect of increased GDP 
values per person there. 
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Finally, the impact of EU policies (Cohesion Policy and Common 
Agricultural Policy) can perhaps be observed, since per capita outlays 
of Cohesion Policy are greater in the less developed regions of the CEE 
countries, and Common Agricultural Policy spending in absolute terms 
obviously favours less developed territories in which agriculture plays a 
relatively more important role than in urbanised areas, thus assisting these 
regions in their economic development.
Figure 4.  Coefficients of variation, GDP/inhabitant, PPP, NUTS3
Source:  Gorzelak G., Smętkowski M., 2020, op. cit.
A clear convergence of GDP per inhabitant between the set of NUTS3[14] 
regions of Central and Eastern Europe can be observed (Figure 5). This 
is the combined result of convergence between the Central and Eastern 
European countries, and regional convergence within them.
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Until 2010-2012, the convergence effect observed for all regions of CEE was 
mainly due to convergence between countries that have been regionally 
diverging, and since the between-country convergence was stronger than 
within-country regional divergence, the overall result has led to general 
regional convergence. However, later convergence happened on both 
these scales (this has also been proved by the ex-post evaluation of the 
Cohesion Policy 2007-2013)[15]. This process may confirm the so-called 
Williamson’s hypothesis[16], according to which the relationship between 
the level of development of a given country and its internal territorial 
differentiation assumes the shape of an inverted U-letter: in the first stages 
of development the differences grow, but after reaching some level they 
begin to decline[17]. This may mean that the CEE countries have reached 
“maturity” in terms of level and regional structure of development. 
Figure 5.  Coefficients of variation, GDP/inhabitant, PPP, NUTS3









INNOVATION, DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
There are several challenges facing the CEE countries and their regions, in 
particular the ability of their economies to compete on the global markets. As 
analyses show[18], relatively poor technological advancement is their common 
deficiency. Progress in this field has mainly been achieved by importing 
technologies from the West, while the domestic potential for creating and 
diffusing innovation is still weak and is 
concentrated in the biggest cities of CEE. 
Peripheral regions suffer from very weak 
innovation potential and the efforts made 
so far cannot be considered satisfactory.
However, there are also challenges specific 
to particular regions of CEE. The demographic 
one seems to be most important. The CEE 
countries are losing their population, and this loss is greatest in the least-
developed regions (the “laggards”) already mentioned several times.
These losses are mainly due to two factors: outmigration and a low fertility 
rate, the latter being to a large extent the outcome of the former. The fertility 
rate (number of children born per woman) should be not lower than 2.1 if 
the population – caeteris paribus – is to grow. The low fertility rate of 1.25 (the 
value for the whole CEE) would have been higher if there had not been a 
tendency to postpone the birth of the first child from the age of around 23 to 
around 28 over the last 30 years. In the peripheral regions the relatively higher 
birth rate is overshadowed by extensive outmigration, and these regions are 
in a relatively worse demographic situation than the urban ones enjoying the 
inflow of a relatively younger population, which further reduces the chances 






  The CEE countries 
are losing their 
population, and this 





Figure 6.  The change in population 
size in NUTS2 regions 
between 1990 and 2017 
(as a percentage of the 
1990 value)
Figure 7.  Total fertility rates, NUTS2 
regions, 2015
Source:  Fihel A., Okólski M., “Demographic change and challenge”, in Gorzelak G. (ed.), Social and Economic… 
op.cit., pp. 101-132.  
The environmental situation in the CEE countries is also a concern. In spite 
of considerable progress in energy production and consumption, as well 
as in environmental protection, in several regions and localities of CEE the 
air quality is very poor (Figures 8 and 9). Dependence on individual heating 
systems running on poor quality coal is still a problem in several countries 
(mostly Poland, a country reluctant to switch to other sources of energy), 
resulting in heavily polluted air during the heating season.  
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Figure 8.  Annual benzoapyrene concentration in EU in 2018
Source: Air quality in Europe - 2019 report, European Environment Agency, Luxembourg, 2019
Figure 9.  Air pollution in Europe in early March 2018
Source: https://www.careourearth.com/air-pollution-in-europe-in-early-spring/  
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General dependence on coal, the most severe pollutant, is still high in some 
CEE countries: in Poland slightly less than 80%, in Bulgaria and Czechia 
around 40-50%. In the Baltic States, however, coal dependency is equal 
to zero in Lithuania and Latvia, and close to zero in Estonia. In most CEE 
countries coal dependency is decreasing.
In 2020, Poland was the only country that did not support the 2019 EU goal 
of making the European Union climate neutral by 2050. Moving to a green 
economy mostly depending on renewable energy will require time, effort 
and investment in the majority of the CEE countries. It can be expected, 
however, that efforts will be made to secure cleaner sources of energy, and 
technological progress in producing and using energy (for example by 
replacing old stoves in private houses by modern ones, and shifting to gas 
and renewable energy) will continue to support these positive changes. 
In January 2020 the European Commission announced the establishment 
of a Just Transition Mechanism, part of the Green Deal and the Sustainable 
Europe Investment Plan. As declared by the Commission, the Just Transition 
Mechanism will provide tailored financial (at least €100 billion) and practical 
support for the necessary investments in regions most affected by the 
transition[19].
The transition towards a more sustainable economic model is not impossible. 
Some regions and cities, like Katowice in Silesia, have already gone through 
a process of renewal and regeneration. The city centre of Katowice, once an 
industrial town, has been completely revamped in the last ten years and now 
hosts the Museum of Silesia, the Polish National Radio Symphony Orchestra 
and the Congress Centre. Investments in cultural upgrading and urban 
development have had a positive impact on the local economy and on the 
city itself, which is now considered to be an emerging metropolis[20]. In the 
Czech Karlove Vary region, cooperation between the spa resort and industrial 
tourism has been established. The Hungarian VisitFactories initiative aims to 
develop post-industrial cities, and several initiatives in Romania demonstrate 
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COHESION POLICY IN  
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:  
ROLE AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
From the very beginning of modern regional policies, most of their patterns 
were subject to the principle of “equity”, and very few followed “efficiency” 
goals. Moreover, the regional policy of the European Union has tended to 
prioritise equalising the level of regional development rather than stimulating 
the growth of particular Member States or the European Union as a whole, 
although in recent periods new goals, such as promoting competitiveness 
and the efficiency of invested resources, have supplemented the “traditional” 
equalisation approach. 
The accession of the CEE countries to the European Union (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia in 2004; 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; and Croatia 
in 2013) brought a new dimension to 
their regional development and regional 
policies. These policies became almost 
totally subordinated, in both financial 
and substantive terms, to the Cohesion 
Policy, of which the New Member States 
(NMS) became the largest beneficiaries. 
However, in spite of the dominant general 
principle of this policy, according to which 
the least-developed regions should receive the most funds, the proportions 
of allocations were, to a large extent, similar to the population proportions 
in these areas – the deviations were rare and small and tended to favour 
remote, less-developed regions[22]. Thus, the aim of diminishing interregional 
disparities with the help of Structural and Cohesion Funds was not always 
achieved because the absorption capacity of relatively less-developed regions 
was smaller than that of urban centres. 
COHESION POLICY 
IN CEE: ROLE AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
  The accession 
of the CEE countries 
to the European 
Union brought a new 
dimension to their 
regional development 
and regional policies. 
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During the first phase of membership, absorption was considered to be the 
main focus of the managing authorities in dealing with the inflow of funds 
from the European Union, but later the rationale of spending – i.e. the efficient 
use of resources according to their purpose – gained in importance. 
The dependency of public investment on Cohesion support has been high 
– in some periods it reached as much as 90% (in Portugal and Greece) – and 
in several NMS is was maintained at a level of between 30% (Slovenia) and 
60% (Croatia) of total public investment. 
Accession to the European Union has brought obvious benefits to both the 
economic and institutional structures of the CEE countries[23]. Their overall 
economic growth has, without doubt, accelerated and helped to achieve 
convergence with the Western European countries. However, this could 
have been primarily the effect of injecting additional resources into the 
economies of these countries (the so-called demand effect). The durable 
economic effects relying on a steady increase in the overall economic 
efficiency of their economies (i.e. the “supply effect”) are still to be proven. 
Nevertheless, the civilisational effects – i.e. improvements in infrastructure, 
quality of environment and other dimensions of quality of life – are evident, 
and this applies to the vast majority (if not all) of the towns and villages in 
the New Member States. 
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Membership of the European Union has also had an impact on a few 
systemic features that shape the regional policies of the CEE countries. The 
clearly positive aspects are:
•  increased importance of strategic thinking at all territorial levels: national, 
regional and local – a necessary development for implementing the 
“programming” principle of the Cohesion Policy;
•  introduction of evaluation as a routine activity in programming, 
implementing and assessing the effects of the projects co-financed by the 
European Union, and constant progress in building an “evaluation culture” 
that is also spreading to other public policies, not necessarily connected to 
the EU programmes; 
•  widespread introduction of transparent tendering rules and compliance 
with competition principles has reduced (but not totally eradicated) the 
extent of corruption in the public sector;
•  strengthening the capabilities of territorial administrations, which enabled 
decentralisation reforms to be undertaken in the New Member States;
•  spreading knowledge of Cohesion Policy principles, regulations and 
requirements, with respect not only to procedures, but also to the goals 
and limitations of regional policies.
46 |
THE “STATUE OF LIBERTY” OUTSIDE 
THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING IN 
BRATISLAVA.
| 47 
However, some negative effects have also occurred:
•  subordination of national preferences to the requirements of the European 
institutions, in terms of both the priorities selected for intervention and 
the resources assigned in the form of national funds supplementing the 
EU funds in order to satisfy the “additionality” principle, i.e. securing 
(public and private) funding that is additional to the funds as-signed by 
the European Union;
•  fixation on “absorption” and “regularity” as the main criteria for assessing 
the quality of implementation of the projects co-financed by the 
European Union: most progress in capacity-building has been made in 
terms of strengthening the ability to strictly obey formal procedural or 
operational compliance with EU regulations and requirements, especially 
regarding financial management and control, sometimes at the expense 
of the rationale and purpose of spending the EU funds[24].
Research has indicated[25] that the institutional reforms have not yet been 
fully completed and that the CEE countries still lag behind Western Europe 
with respect to the level of governance. Recent recentralisation processes, 
seen mostly in Hungary and Poland, but also visible in Czechia and Slovakia, 
may challenge the efficiency of preparing and implementing innovative 
strategies for regional development. In a centralised institutional setting 
it would be difficult (if not impossible) to (re)build regional and local 
government structures as credible, capable entities able to prepare and 
implement strategies tailored to the needs and potentials of the respective 
regions.
VANSU BRIDGE, RIGA. THE CAPITAL 
OF LATVIA CAN RELY ON MODERN 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND GENERATES MORE THAN 50%  





REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT:  
WHAT’S NEXT?
The future of regional development and regional policies in the CEE countries 
is still uncertain. The peak of funding through the EU Cohesion Policy has 
come to an end for most CEE Member States, and it appears that the European 
Union is determined to prioritise other spending goals (such as innovation 
development, tackling climate change, coping with migration pressures, 
strengthening integration within the euro area) through the EU budget, 
over those which used to be the most important for the New Member 
States (support for the less-developed regions, building basic infrastructure, 
improving the environment). This is due to the reforms of the Cohesion Policy, 
which have dominated the national regional policies of the New Member 
States, and to a large extent have shaped the processes of regional and local 
development. 
The recent discussions seemed to indicate that the traditional support for less-
developed regions may be curbed, and that the shares of the total Cohesion 
Policy budget dedicated to innovation, research and development, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, competitiveness, climate action, development of 
sustainable sources of energy and social inclusion and poverty relief measures 
may be significantly increased. Also cuts in the CAP may be harmful to the 
less-developed regions, in which agriculture plays a relatively important role. 
This may place the strongest urban centres of the CEE countries, which are 
best prepared for developing knowledge-intensive services, in an even more 
favourable position, and thus reverse the new trend of regional equalisation. 
Also, this evolution of EU priorities may pose a difficult task for some of the 
CEE countries that have not yet been able to develop a sound and solid 
R&D base and strong capabilities for creating their own innovations, and 
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Dependence of the least-developed CEE regions on transfers from the 
European Union (in some less-developed regions as much as over 10% 
of their yearly GDP) for financing most of their infrastructure may jeopardise 
the resilience of these regions to the forthcoming reduction of these 
transfers, and to the demographic crisis which several of these regions are 
facing. If these regions are to continue their economic growth, the national 
governments will have to rethink the regional allocations of funds coming 
from the European Union. 
The above remarks were made before the recent coronavirus epidemic. 
The shape of the global economy, and of the situation of the European 
Union as a whole as well as of its Member States cannot be foreseen yet: 
all scenarios are still possible. No matter which materialises, EU policies will 
have to be fundamentally reshaped and adapted to the new, perhaps even 
dramatic challenges and pressing needs of the societies and economies of 
the European Union. In any case, it cannot be expected that the needs and 
interests of the CEE countries will be prioritised in the same way as during 
the first period of their membership. Therefore, the reservations formulated 
concerning the future situation of the countries within the European Union 





In 2004-2007, after the accession of CEE countries to the European Union, a 
conviction of “end of history” emerged. Many people in these countries believed 
that the path to a mature democracy and efficient market economy was straight 
and that the New Member States would proceed along this path without major 
upheavals. This attitude was first undermined by the financial crisis of 2008-2010, 
which reduced economic output in some CEE countries by as much as 20%. Then 
came the migration crisis of 2015-2016, which was used by populist politicians to 
challenge the principles of European solidarity, and in some countries (especially 
Hungary and Poland) subsequently served to support the trends of weakening 
the rule of law and the foundations of deliberative, liberal democracy. 
There may be several explanations for these developments. Some relate to global 
trends and suggest that globalisation has led to feelings of uncertainty, and that 
simple explanations delivered by populist politicians are more plausible than 
sophisticated analyses. According to this line of reasoning, the CEE countries 
are following these global trends, and the weaknesses of their relatively new 
institutions of democracy mean that they are unable to defend themselves 
against the pressures of populism. Other explanations[26] indicate that the CEE 
societies have become tired of imitating the West, or that they have begun to 
doubt that western values are appropriate for Central and Eastern European 
societies. Although this may not reach the extent of rejecting those values, 
the CEE societies may have come to the conclusion that they will never meet 
western standards and are starting to defend themselves by challenging these 
standards. Frustration and feelings of exploitation and humiliation may create the 
foundations for approval of authoritarian rule and for agreement to breaching 
the rules of democracy. Also, resentments could have been triggered by the 
partial abandonment by political elites of the notion of a “nation” and “nation 
state”, which would be replaced by regionalism and Europeanism[27]. It should 
be observed that during the coronavirus crisis the role of the European Union is 
being challenged by some authoritarian regimes of CEE, and claims of reinforcing 
the nation states are being openly expressed.END OF HISTORY?
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Finally, support for populist attitudes may stem from the feelings of rejection 
and being forgotten that affect the relatively less educated strata of the 
economically active population, which have become unneeded as a result of 
the relocation of factories to countries with 
lower labour costs and also the cutting of jobs 
due to automation and robotisation[28]. 
To some extent this last explanation is – at 
least partially – proved by regional research. 
According to some analysts, the rise of populism 
is “the revenge of places that don’t matter”[29] 
or a response to “regional resentment”[30]. 
Support for right-wing populism is strongest in 
regions which have undergone deep economic 
restructuring and also in those which have been 
left aside by positive trends of transformation. In Western Europe it is the urban 
centres that demonstrate these attitudes to the largest extent. However, in 
CEE most of the big cities appeared to be the beneficiaries of transformation, 
and these flourishing cities resist the trends of destroying democracy and 
introducing a kind of autocratic rule. However, there is another kind of “places 
that don’t matter”– the peripheral, least-developed regions (the “laggards”), 
where these tendencies do find the strongest support.
Can regional policy respond to such challenges? The recent trends of territorial 
convergence, observed in most of the CEE countries may indicate that the 
“forgotten places” had hoped to find their opportunities. However, as already 
mentioned earlier, the expected changes in EU policies (also strongly influenced 
in the future by the recent coronavirus epidemic) may work in the opposite 
direction. Additionally, connecting the magnitude of support directed to the 
New Member States with the latter’s fulfilment of the standards of the rule of 
law and liberal democracy may also lead to cuts in assistance to some countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (in spite of the fact that these issues have been 
suspended for a while in the face of the epidemic), thus limiting the possibilities 
of accelerating the development of their least-developed, peripheral regions.
  The recent 
trends of territorial 
convergence, 
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the CEE countries 
may indicate that the 
“forgotten places” had 
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